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THE COURTS AND THE LABOR AGENCIES*
Harold Leventhal**
The overarching question of whether, and to what extent, a
democratic society should call on the law in the field of labor relations, presents both profound and complex issues, going deep into
the taproots of political philosophy and public administration. This
commentary accepts the reality that American democracy has made
a substantial and increasing call on the law in the regulation of labor
relations. This tendency builds on the civilizing function of the law
to permit the resolution of disputes without violence. Labor disputes
reflect deep tensions, and require difficult choices of values. Resolution of conflicting forces through the medium of law, rather than in
pitched battle, presents both opportunity and risk in the development of pertinent principles.
To harness the emotion-charged centrifugal forces that tend to
pull labor and management apart, and to bring them together effectively without counterproductive hostility, calls for more than mere
rules of law. The focus must be to an equal, or even greater extent,
upon men and machinery to evolve and apply sound approaches.
The lens of the law on labor relations was once focused almost
exclusively by judges using court machinery. The emphasis is not
ancient history; it describes the state of things only fifty years ago.
The court developed labor law as a special case of the law of torts.
There were actions at law, notoriously in the Danbury Hatterscase,I
but for the most part pertinent procedures were part of the domain
of equity.' The classic Frankfurter and Greene work, The Labor
Injunction,' describes how the federal courts were invoked by employers to intervene in labor disputes.
Today the federal field finds the first line of legal machinery in
the administrative agency, and more recently in the executive official. The courts are secondary, essentially a reviewing mechanism
to assure general fairness. In sum, federal labor relations has become essentially a special case of the field of federal administrative
law. At least, that has been the dominant feature of the landscape
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since the Wagner Act of 1935,1 when the National Labor Relations
Board was established.
It is the purpose of this article to review some developments
in
labor law as a branch of administrative law, with particular
emphasis, not on content, but on structure-addressing in particular:
(1)
the dominant role of the agency with some swing in the pendulum
of judicial review; (2) the furtherance of that role through
emphasis
on federal preemption; and (3) the agency's latitude to
defer to
arbitration. In addition, there will be a peek at new problems
under
the Landrum-Griffin Act.
A SPECIAL CASE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The salient principles of the rule of administrative law
are
available in a number of texts and opinions. For convenience,
I refer
to my own summary in Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC5
where the usual facts required a particularly careful and
probing
inquiry into the integrity of the administrative decision.'
The opinion sets out the court's "supervisory" function in the review
of
agency decisions. The implementation of this function begins
with
the enforcement of reasonable agency procedure. "It continues
into
examination of the evidence and agency's findings of facts,
for the
court must be satisfied that the agency's evidentiary fact
findings
are supported by substantial evidence, and provide rational
support
for the agency's inferences of ultimate fact."7 The function
culminates with the all-important requirement of reasoned decisionmaking.1
The court must not intrude into the administrative function.
"If the agency has not shirked this fundamental task. . .
the court
[should] exercise restraint and affirm the agency's action
even
though the court would on its own account have made
different
I.

4. Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1970)).
5. 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C.Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971).
6. The FCC in effect dislodged a Boston newspaper from
a television station it had
operated for 12 years.
7. 444 F.2d at 850 (footnotes omitted).
8. Assuming consistency with law and the legislative
mandate, the Agency has
latitude not merely to find facts and make judgments, but
also to select the policies
deemed in the public interest. The function of the Court
is to assure that the Agency
has given reasoned consideration to all the material facts
and issues. This calls for
insistence that the Agency articulate with reasonable clarity
its reasons for decision,
and identify the significance of the crucial facts, a course
that tends to assure the
agency's policies effectuate general standards, applied without
unreasonable discrimination.
444 F.2d at 851.
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findings or adopted different standards."
Overall, the balance of agency and court action in the field of
labor relations is in the public interest:
The process thus combines judicial supervision with a salutary principle of judicial restraint, an awareness that agencies and courts together constitute a "partnership" in furtherance of the public interest, and are "collaborative instrumentalities of justice." The court is
in a real sense part of the total administrative process, and not a
hostile stranger to the office of first instance. . . .Reasoned decision
promotes results in the public interest by requiring the agency to
focus on the values served by its decisions, and hence releasing the
clutch of unconscious preference and irrelevant prejudice. It furthers
the broad public interest of enabling the public to~repose confidence
0
in the process as well as the judgments of its decision-makers.1
The Integrity of Agency Fact-Findings
Without question, the finding of the facts is the single most
crucial aspect of decisionmaking in the field of labor relations law.
Accordingly, the transfer of the fact-finding function from the courts
to administrative bodies was at first acceded to grudgingly, and only
under the pressure of numbers. -Resistance characterized earlier
transfers involving agencies regulating railroad rates or administering workmen's compensation awards. But it was almost tangible
emotion which emerged when, in the 1930's, the rights of collective
bargaining were set for implementation by the National Labor Relations Board. Charges of bias were common. Justice Harlan Stone,
in his epochal address, The Common Law, warned the courts
had
against the kind of resistance to administrative agencies that
resistance
led the old courts of law into an outraged and futile
against the upstart, Equity." He did not identify the Labor Board
by name, but that was the agency most in contention at the time.
The Supreme Court soon made it clear that the Board's role
must be rooted in reason and not absolute prerogative. The Wagner
as to the facts, if
Act provided that "[t]he findings of the Board
2 Very soon after the
supported by evidence, shall be conclusive."'
Court upheld the Act's3 validity, it read "evidence" to mean
"substantial evidence.' It soon added that "substantial evidence

A.

9.
10.
11.
thought
12.
13.

Id.
444 F.2d at 851-52 (footnotes omitted).
4 (1936). The
Stone, The Common Law In The United States, 50 HoAv. L. REv.
recurs in United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198 § 1(e), 49 Stat. 449, 454 (1935).
Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
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is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."" It "must do more than create a suspicion" and must be
enough to justify sending an ordinary case to the jury. 5
In the following term, however, the Supreme Court rebuked a
circuit court that had refused to enforce a National Labor Relations
Board order on the ground that the order rested on mere suspicion
rather than substantial evidence."6 The Board's petition for certiorari had complained that in a number of instances the Fifth Circuit
had failed to respect the Board's findings. The Supreme Court emphasized the "paramount importance" of the Board's fact-finding
power "if effect is to be given the intention of Congress to apply an
orderly, informed and specialized procedure to the complex administrative problems arising in the solution of industrial disputes
... .Congress has deemed it wise to entrust the finding of facts

to these specialized agencies."17

The drumbeat of complaint against the Board and its processes
and against judicial "abdication" rolled on. If labor law had become
an arm of administrative law, the passions of labor law led to the
modification of the principles underlying administrative law-the
history of which is developed in the opinion by Justice Frankfurter
in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB. 18Specifically, there was demand for a standard of judicial review, as broad as the power to
reverse "clearly erroneous" findings of a trial judge. With much
pulling and hauling, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946's
passed with a "substantial evidence" test made applicable to administrative agencies generally. In addition, Congress identified a
further requirement that "the court shall review the whole record." 0
At about the same time, Congress was considering and subsequently
passed the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,21 which contained a similar
provision of "substantial evidence" review based on a canvassing of
"the whole record."
In Universal Camera, Justice Frankfurter recognized the lack
of clarity in this legislative development. He found a "mood" in the
legislation, which imposed a duty on the courts that is subtle but
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292,
300 (1939).
NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
Id. at 208-09.
340 U.S. 474 (1951).
5 U.S.C. §§ 556(d) and 706(2)(E) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-49 (1970).
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nonetheless real. While this review obligation did not mean usurpation of the role of the Labor Board as an agency "presumably
equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field
of knowledge," it authorized the reviewing court to assess the
Board's finding not only in terms of the evidence supporting the
Board but against "whatever in the record fairly detracts from its
weight." 2
Universal Camera identified the significance of the report of the
trial examiner, now called the administrative law judge, as a part
of the whole record. If it disagrees with his findings of fact, the
In efBoard must show it has taken his report into consideration.
3 In addition, there
disagrees.1
it
why
explain
must
fect, the Board
is the imponderable weight of the finding of the examiner, since
"evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an
impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the witnesses
and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from the
"..."24
Board's .
Finally, the Supreme Court made it clear that judicial review
of findings of fact was a task for the courts of appeal and not the
Supreme Court. "This Court will intervene only in what ought to
instance when the standard appears to have been misapbe the rare
25
plied."
Twenty-five years later, Universal Camera's delicate balancing
of the scales seems to have resulted in a workable equilibrium. The
Supreme Court typically has a full platter of Labor Board cases. For
the most part, however, they do not turn on evidentiary support for
fact findings.
The Court has cautioned that the "substantial evidence" rule
applies to findings of fact, and does not undercut the reviewing
court's responsibility to discern governing principles of law and legislative intent." The distinction is not always easy to apply since
expressed
22. It is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood. And it
must be
mood
that
legislation
As
legislation.
by
but
its mood not merely by oratory
not as a body
respected, even though it can only serve as a standard for judgment and
broad standards
of rigid rules assuring saneness of application. Enforcement of such
question that
implies subtlety of mind and solidity of judgment. But it is not for us to
judiciary.
federal
the
in
qualities
such
assume
Congress may
340 U.S. at 487.
628 (D.C.Cir.
23. American Fed. of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622,
1965).
(D.C.Cir.
494
F.2d
360
NLRB,
v.
400
Local
1968); Retail Store Employees Union,
24. 340 U.S. at 496.
25. 340 U.S. at 491.
272 (1968):
26. Compare Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261,
inertia
judicial
a
into
slip
to
allowed
be
cannot
tribunal
expert
an
"The deference owed to
" quoting American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1964).
...
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some of the issues that are governed by the "substantial evidence"
standard of review, e.g., whether newsboys are "employees,27 might
be considered legal issues in other contexts, but in the context of
this Act are part of the industry background on which agency experience is more important than judicial learning in the common law
of master-servant.
There is also confusion concerning the concepts that are part
of the lore. When I had the luxury of a separate opinion, I voiced
some doubt as to whether I could distinguish realistically between
the "substantial evidence" and "clearly erroneous" standards of
review.28 It is important to remember that one is dealing with the
"mood" of code words in the statute. The same difficulty
in analytical distinction exists between finding a fact as established "beyond
a reasonable doubt," the standard for criminal cases, or only "by
clear and convincing evidence," the standard for fraud cases, deportation, and soforth.2 9
In any event, the courts are aware of their responsibility to
ensure the fact-finding integrity of the Labor Board. My perception
is that the courts do not often set aside Board findings of fact.
Whether their power to do so under Universal Camera may affect
the fact findings in the first instance, and hence affect the result in
many more cases than are reversed or even appealed, is a separate
question.
B.

Reasoned Decisionmaking
A core requirement of administrative law is that of reasoned
decisionmaking. In my view, the rulings of the National Labor Relations Board in complaint cases generally satisfy the requirement.
The corps of administrative law judges (ALJ's) produce a body of
decisions and opinions that strike me, after some twelve years of
reasonably broad judicial exposure, as considered rulings that are
reasonably careful as to the facts. The Board's order is often, probably typically, a summary affirmance. What is particularly instruc27. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). This might be more
cautiously put as a situation where the "substantial evidence" standard is predominant,
if not
the sole test. The Court useid the formulation that the Board's determination
whether a
person is an "employee" under the Act is "to be accepted if it has 'warrant in
the record'
and a reasonable basis in law." Id. at 131. But the inquiry is identified as belonging
"to the
usual administrative routine" of the Board; it is heavily fact-laden; and is an inquiry
to be
addressed in light of the Board's familiarity with various employment relationships,
and the
adaptability of collective bargaining for peaceful settlement of disputes with employees.
28. IBEW, Local 68 v. NLRB, 448 F.2d 1127 (D.C.Cir. 1971) (dissenting).
29. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966); Collins
Sec.
Corp. v. SEC, No. 75-220 (D.C.Cir., Aug. 12, 1977).
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tive, in my view, is the care the ALJ's take to follow pertinent
rulings of the Board and of the courts, and to explicate the legal
issues they discern. This all makes for a body of well reasoned decisions.
Occasionally, the Board's counsel in the appellate court will
endeavor to support its decision on a ground not set forth in the
Board's decision. Counsel may develop some position, often sensible
enough, to resolve what appear to be inconsistencies between rulings
of the Board. The law on the subject is plain enough; it is the Board
that has the obligation to resolve seeming inconsistencies, and this
offered by counsel in
cannot be done by substituting the rationale
3
1
Board.
the
by
place of that articulated
One encounters appellate opinions remanding cases for an explanation of inconsistencies or apparent inconsistencies in Board
rulings." No less can be demanded in the interest of even-handed
justice. Occasionally, more has been sought. The32 courts have frequently expressed approval of the view of scholars that rulemaking
is preferable to individual adjudications in the common law tradition.
In an opinion involving another agency, I have voiced
"uneasiness lest an excessively individuated approach may be a33
weed of discrimination.
seed bed that is too favorable to the rank
has been articulate on the subject, in
Similarly, Judge Friendly
35
1
34
lectures, and opinions.
The Supreme Court has insisted in SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
however, that while an agency with rulemaking powers has less
is clear
30. NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, 417 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). The doctrine
It applies
(1976).
413-17
at
1707-4,
§
70's,
THE
IN
LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE
DAVIS,
enough. K.C.
412 U.S. 800, 808
to agencies generally. Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade,
Chem-Haulers,
(1954);
653
645,
U.S.
347
States,
United
v.
Agriculture
of
Secretary
(1973);
National
Second
The
1977);
19,
Sept.
(D.C.Cir.
11
Inc. v. ICC, No. 76-1488, slip op. at
slip op. at 23 (D.C.Cir.
al.,
et
76-2000
No.
FPC)
v.
al.
et
(APGA
Cases,
Rate
Gas
Natural
(D.C.Cir. 1977).
June 16, 1977); Continental Air Lines v. CAB, 551 F.2d 1293, 1303
31. See, e.g., UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Performance in
32. See, e.g., Peck, A Critique of The National Labor Relations Board
254 (1968); Shapiro,
Policy Formulation:Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
The Choice of Rule-Making or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy,
of the NationalLabor
78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers
(1961).
729
L.J.
YALE
70
Board,
Relations
390 U.S.
33. City of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629, 644 (D.C.Cir. 1967), cert. denied
945 (1968).
34.

FOR BETTER DEFINIH. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED

(1962).
346, 349 (2d Cir.
35. See, e.g., dissenting opinion in NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d
in that case clearly
1965), pointing out that the NLRB decision which was denied enforcement
would have been valid if established in a rulemaking proceeding.

TION OF STANDARDS
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reason than a court to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate
new standards of conduct, the administrative process includes the
power to proceed case-by-case.36 Furthermore, this holding outweighs the earlier dictum in that opinion that "the function of filling
in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.""3
The vitality of the Chenery decision has been reaffirmed quite
recently. In Bell Aerospace Co. Division of Textron v. NLRB, 8
Judge Friendly held that while the Labor Board might reverse its
earlier ruling that buyers for retail stores were not "managerial employees" excluded from the Act, it was required to do so in a rulemaking proceeding in which it could have all available information
before it. 9 The Supreme Court reversed on this point, holding it was
within the Board's discretion whether to announce new principles
in an adjudicative proceeding rather than rulemaking10 The Court
observed, however, that "there may be situations where the Board's
reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion,,,4
but it did not suggest which considerations would point in this
direction.
The courts, then, must defer to the Board's judgment that its
range of activities is so broad, the variety of industry situations so
immense, the field so fact-specific, that rulemaking is not useful. "It
is doubtful whether any generalized standard could be framed
which would have more than marginal utility."4 Yet the thousands
of cases decided annually by the Board and the shadings of facts,
continue to raise the specter of ad hoc rulings, not even-handed in
application, with an unnecessarily unfair retroactive cast. The
agency-court tension remains.
C.

Remedies
Remedies are so important in the field of labor relations as to
warrant separate discussion. In general, administrative law doctrine
36. 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947):
In other words, problems may arise in a case which the . . . agency
may not have had
sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying
its tentative
judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so specialized
and varying
in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of
a general rule.
37. 332 U.S. at 202.
38. 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
39. 475 F.2d at 495-96.
40. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
41. Id.
42. Id.
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has provided a lesser scope for court review when the issue is one of
remedy rather than right,4" although the issue of remedy is not less
important than the substantive determination. It is a question of
institutional competence. For various reasons, including the lack of
knowledge of the overall state of affairs in the real world of laborindustry conflict and of the mechanics of compliance, courts are not
equipped to make the pragmatic judgments necessary for a workable remedial order.
There is an occasional instance, in the context of other agencies, of a court advancing a greater judicial role in the field of remedies." However, the preeminent postion of the NLRB in the matter
of remedies has been and continues to be respected5 by the courts.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the Seven-Up case staked out the
governing principles when the Court upheld the decision to award
both reinstatement and back pay in a case of discriminatory discharge. Quoting Justice Holmes, the Court concluded that judgments as to appropriate remedies may "express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and
tangled impressions."" The Court rejected the complaint that the
formula used by the Board did not rest on data derived in the course
of the pending proceeding:
In devising a remedy the Board is not confined to the record of a
particular proceeding. "Cumulative experience" begets understanding and insight by which judgments not objectively demonstrable are
validated or qualified or invalidated . . . .Administrative competence could not be exercised if in fashioning remedies the administrative agency were restricted to considering only what was before it in
a single proceeding.' 7
The voice of the courts is muted as to remedies, but not completely stilled. One important instance of judicial interposition is
5
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,1 where the Court held that an order
making workers whole for their loss of pay is subject to a deduction
not only for actual earnings during the period but also for losses
willfully incurred. The Board contended that this "abstractly just"
doctrine of mitigation would be too burdensome for effective admin(1946).
43. Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 622 (1966); FCC v. Woko, Inc., 329 U.S. 223
modifica44. See Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 184 (2d Cir. 1976) (judicial
laws).
tion of penalty imposed by SEC upon broker-dealer for violation of the securities
45. NLRB v. Seven-up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
585, 598
46. 344 U.S. at 348, quoting from Chicago, B & Q R.R. v. Babcock, 204 U.S.
(1966).
47. 344 U.S. at 349.
48. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
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istration by the Board. The Court responded: "But the advantages
of a simple rule must be balanced against the importance of taking
fair account, in a civilized legal system, of every socially desirable
factor in the final judgment. The Board, we believe, overestimates
administrative difficulties and underestimates its administrative
resourcefulness."" 9 The Court indicated the Board could reject speculative claims by employers, and "give appropriate weight to a
clearly unjustifiable refusal to take desirable new employment."50
This was an assertion by the Court on administrative capability, and I am not at all certain that Justice Frankfurter would have
arrived at the same ruling if he could have foreseen the consequences for the Board and the courts.5 ' But Phelps Dodge stands as
an indication that administrative burden does not loom large as
against the claim of manifest justness unless it is sharply supported
by factual demonstration.
In at least one recent instance, an initial Board claim of administrative infeasibility was reconsidered by the Board on a court remand in order to take account of all material elements of remedial
policy. In the Tiidee Products case,52 our court considered a union
request for additional relief where an employer's refusal to bargain
was considered based on "patently frivolous" objections to an election, so that the refusal to bargain was found to be "a clear and
flagrant violation of the law."5 We remanded for further Board
consideration of the possibility of supplementary remedies, and outlined possibilities for Board consideration." On remand, the Board
ordered reimbursement of litigation expenses to discourage future
frivolous litigation 51 This was an example of court respect for the
administrative agency's role, and of the agency's appreciation of the
seriousness of the factors identified by the court, culminating in a
modification of the agency's initial view. It is an instance of the
agency-court partnership working collaboratively, in Justice Stone's
phrase, in furtherance of the legislative objective.
An outpost of judicial deference to the Board's remedy determi49. Id. at 198.
50. Id. at 199-200.
51. For an example of difficulties in applying the mitigation doctrine, and the
possibility that it may engender a greater disposition on the court to displace the Board's
approach
to remedy, see Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 68 v. NLRB, 448
F.2d 1127
(D.C.Cir. 1971).
52. Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, v. NLRB [Tiidee Products, Inc.],
426 F.2d
1243 (D.C.Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
53. Id. at 1248.
54. Id. at 1249-53.
55. Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972).
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5
nations is NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. " The Court upheld the
Board's authority to issue a bargaining order even in the absence of
the primary mechanism contemplated by the Act-a secret ballot
election by unit employees. The Court held that a bargaining order
was appropriate where the employer rejects a request to bargain
based on a presentation of authorization cards from a majority of
the unit, and commits unfair labor practices undermining the conditions of a fair election. The issuance of a bargaining order on the
basis of cards was an administrative response to a recurring problem
- of employer conduct polluting the atmosphere for holding a bargaining election (the optimal approach) - which Congress had not
considered. With some hesitancy, but ultimate deference, the Gissel
court gave recognition to the administrative judgment of the necessity for a remedy not enjoying explicit congressional authorization.
Overall, the vitality of the Board's discretion in the matter of
remedies is captured by Chief Justice, then Chief Judge, Burger's
opinion upholding a novel Board remedy with the phrase: "In the
evolution of the law 57of remedies, some things are bound to happen
for the 'first time'.

II.

THE STRUCTURE OF LABOR LAW DECISIONMAKING

We have examined how administrative law principles have
been applied to liberate the exercise of NLRB expertise in the field
of industrial law. The courts have also played a structural role,
which has served to enlarge the latitude of the Board through various doctrines by: (1) insulating from review a decision not to file a
complaint; (2) diminishing the role of state law, through the doctrine of preemption; and (3) by permitting both Board deference to
arbitration and recognizing Board supremacy over arbitral outcomes.
A Centralized Forum
Federal labor Acts, i.e., the Wagner Act as amended by the
Taft-Hartley Act, embody a system of centralized agency control of
the dispute resolution process. The Board does not enjoy a roving
commission. The processes of the Act do not come into play until
private parties file charges. The decision whether or not to issue a
complaint on such charges is a matter of virtually unreviewable
58
discretion under section 10(e) of the Act. The rule of finality en-

A.

56. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
Cir.
57. International Bhd. of Operative Engineers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 757, 761 (D.C.
1963).
58. Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
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sures a time for administrative judgment unhampered by premature judicial oversight; and in election and representation proceedings, perhaps a key function of the Board, there is particular assurance against any early call on the court.59 Pre-enforcement review
is generally unavailable, 0 except in the case of a patently unauthorized assumption of jurisdiction.'
The Board is the first-line guardian of the public rights created
by the Act. Once the Board has exercised its discretion to issue a
complaint, however, the right of private intervention and the duty
of judicial review ripens. Dismissals of complaints are judicially
reviewable12 Similarly, parties who are successful in unfair labor
practice proceedings before the Board have a right to intervene in
the court of appeals review proceedings, in order to assist the court
in the process of defining the public interest in the particular case.
In UA W Local 283 v. Scofield, the Court noted:
In short, we think that the statutory pattern of the Labor Act
does not dichotomize "public" as opposed to "private" interest.
Rather, the two interblend in the intricate statutory scheme ....
We find nothing inconsistent in denying the right of a private party
to institute a contempt proceeding - where the Board's expertness
in achieving compliance with orders is challenged - and, on the
other hand, in permitting intervention in a proceeding already in the
court for decision. When the court is to rule on the merits of the
Board's order, the Act supports the view that it is the court and not
the agency which will define the public interest ....
63
B.

Preemption

Ordinarily the Supreme Court requires a showing of actual conflict
with a federal program, before it will raise the Supremacy Clause
as a bar to the exercise of concurrent state jurisdiction. In the labor
area, however, the Court has been particularly solicitous of the expertise of the National Labor Relations Board and of the value of
uniformity in lawmaking and fact-finding. Subject to certain narrow exceptions, the rule is one that finds federal preemption of state
(NLRB is exclusively vested with the power and duty to enforce the Act, e.g. to petition the
court of appeals for an order adjudging an employer in contempt for failure to abide by a
previous cease and desist order).
59. American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940) (review of certification
decisions must await the proceeding in the court of appeals to enforce or set aside an unfair
labor practice determination).
60. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 300 U.S. 41 (1938).
61. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
62. Garment Workers Local 415 v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 823 (D.C.Cir. 1974); Lees & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966).
63. 382 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1965).
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regulation in the event of merely arguable conflict." There is no
denial of the capacity of state courts fairly to adjudicate disputes
governed by federal law, 5 but the Court has acted to ensure a centralized administration of the Act. Justice Frankfurter explained:
We have necessarily been concerned with the potential conflict
of two law-enforcing authorities, with the disharmonies inherent in
two systems, one federal and the other state, of inconsistent standards of substantive law and differing remedial schemes. But the
unifying consideration of our decisions has been regard to the fact
that Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy for the
Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own
procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience ....
Administration is more than a means of regulation; administration is regulation. We have been concerned with conflict in its broadest sense; conflict with a complex and interrelated federal scheme of
law, remedy, and administration. Thus, judicial concern has necessarily focused on the nature of the activities which the States have
sought to regulate, rather than on the method of regulation adopted.
When the exercise of state power over a particular area of activity
threatened interference with the clearly indicated policy of industrial
relations, it has been judicially necessary to preclude the States from
acting."
The preemptive boundaries of the Act are enforced not only by the
Court but by the NLRB's injunctive actions to restrain state proceedings.67
The preemption rulings have carved out a vast area of primary
conduct where the Board, at least in the first instance, is the exclusive expositor of law and finder of facts. The Court has recognized
in the Board a spacious jurisdiction to fashion a coherent body of
regulatory law.
C. Arbitration
Much like the preemption rulings, the Supreme Court's arbitration decisions have refined the statutory framework so as to permit the Board an enviable freedom to promulgate regulatory policy.
In the "Steelworkers Trilogy" the Court recognized a presumption
in favor of arbitrability and a rule of judicial deference to arbitral
determinations." In addition, the power of the federal court in eq64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
359 U.S. at 242-43.
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971).
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelwork-
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uity has been made available to enforce promises to arbitrate.6 9
The express rationale of these decisions has been a recognition
of the congressional preference for arbitral resolution of contract
disputes. But it cannot be ignored that the effect of these decisions
is to delegate a substantial part of the Board's fact-finding burden
to the dispute resolution agents that the parties have voluntarily
chosen. The Board remains in control, to give ultimate vindication
to statutory policies, but it has been freed of much of the minutiae
of regulation.70
The preference for arbitration serves as a principle that complements the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board but
does not oust the Board from its central role. Under section 10 of
the Act, the Board's power is not "affected by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by
agreement, law, or otherwise." 7 ' The Board is free to disagree with
the arbitrator's determination; its ruling "would, of course, take
precedence .
In NLRB v. Acme Industrial the Court made
clear that the rule of accomodation announced in the "Steelworkers
Trilogy" dealt with the relationship of courts to arbitrators, "and
recognized "the arbitrator's greater institutional competency
. . ..,''Justice Stewart noted: "The relationship of the Board to
the arbitration process is of a quite different order."7 4 Acme
Industrialholds that there is no requirement of automatic deference
to arbitral outcomes. This is a matter for the sound exercise of the
Board's discretion. The Board may act to vindicate statutory policies even when there is some overlap with contract issues and inconsistency with contractual remedies.7"
*."..,

ers v. Warrier & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
69. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Gateway Coal
Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). But see Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S.
397 (1976).
70. The Board has not been unmindful of this unexpressed benefit of the "Steelworkers
Trilogy" and related decisions. As early as 1955, the Board articulated a policy of deference
to arbitration awards - the "Spielberg Doctrine." Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080
(1955). This rule of deference has been expanded to require initial resort to the arbitration
process. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). Recent developments indicate a
partial retreat from Spielberg.Collyer with respect to claims of employer interference with
basic employee rights or union coercion, see, e.g., General American Transp. Corp., 228
N.L.R.B. No. 102 (1977), but the basic doctrine is still alive, see, e.g., Roy Robinson, Inc.
228 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (1977).
71. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
72. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
73. 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967).
74. Id. at 436.
75. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964); NLRB v. Acme In-
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The arbitration decisions give the Board the best of both
worlds. The primacy of its regulatory role is undisturbed, but it
enjoys the administrative convenience of channeling cases to alternative forums, and in a sense exercises a kind of discretionary jurisdiction with respect to cases which have gone through the arbitration process.
II.

NEW FIELDS -

THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ANALOGY

The passage in 1959 of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act)" opens up a new field for
examining the interaction of agency and court in the sphere of industrial law. Unlike the National Labor Relations Act, the
Landrum-Griffin Act combines the principles of private enforcement and agency stewardship of the public interest. With respect
to the privately enforced titles, the court's role is to review the
determinations of labor unions in resolving internal disputes. With
a few exceptions,7 7 the Department of Labor is not involved. If there
is a rule of deference, it is responsive not to considerations of expertise but to the congressional desire to minimize judicial interference
with the internal affairs of labor unions.7"
The closest parallel to NLRB cases is Title IV of the LandrumGriffin Act, the title governing the procedures for conducting internal union elections. In Calhoon v. Harvey,79 the Court held that the
exclusive method for the enforcement of Title IV rights is a suit at
the behest of the Secretary of Labor. Justice Black noted:
It is apparent that Congress decided to utilize the special knowledge and discretion of the Secretary of Labor in order best to serve
the public interest. Cf. San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 . . . . Reliance on the discretion of the
Secretary is in harmony with the general congressional policy to allow
unions great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies,
and, where that fails, to utilize the agencies of Government most
familiar with union problems to aid in bringing about a settlement
through discussion before resort to the courts.8
The reference to Justice Frankfurter's decision in Garmon is
instructive, for in Garmon the Court has announced a rule of
dustrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); NLRB
v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-539 (1970).
77. Brennan v. District 50, 499 F.2d 1051 (D.C.Cir. 1974).
78. See, e.g., Ritz v. O'Donnell, 566 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 6, 1977).
79. 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
80. Id. at 140.
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preemption. The sound application of agency expertise requires a
measure of centralization of the dispute resolution process and uniformity of prescriptive rules-a sphere of "primary jurisdiction."
The court plays a definite role because the agency's determination
is not self-enforcing. Here, the agency (the Department of Labor)
must go to court to set aside a union election. The court owes no
deference with respect to the findings of facts, however, because
there has been no initial adjudication at the agency level. But, as
with the National Labor Relations Board,8 ' due recognition is given
to the regulatory determinations of the Secretary of Labor, e.g., that
a particular union election requirement constricts unduly the participation rights of union members."2
The parallel to the NLRB is not exact. The Secretary of Labor
is not responsible for conducting an ongoing regulatory program, but
intervenes in union affairs solely to overturn elections violative of
the Act. There is no claim to special competence in fact-finding.
With respect to the Secretary's decision whether or not to bring suit,
for example, he must give a statement of reasons sufficient to
"inform the court and the complaining union member of both the
grounds of decision and the essential facts upon which the Secretary's inferences are based."83 As with any agency determination,
the courts are not to substitute their judgment; their review obligation is satisfied upon finding that the Secretary has not abused his
discretion. 4 But the requirement of a statement of reasons for the
Secretary's exercise of prosecutorial discretion provides more scope
for judicial overseeing than is available for the NLRB General
Counsel's decision whether or not to issue a complaint.
The private complainant enjoys a right of participation under
Title IV which is not significantly different from that of his counterpart under the National Labor Relations Act. Trbovich v. UMW 5
recognized a limited right of intervention once the Secretary has
exercised his discretion to challenge a union election. The intervenor
may urge grounds in support of the Secretary's position and may
assist the court upon the finding of a violation in fashioning an
appropriate remedial order. Reasonable attorney's fees may be
86
available for, this assistance.
81.
82.
83.
84.
97 S.Ct.
85.
86.

Cf. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
See Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 573-74 (1975).
See, e.g., Usery v. Local 639, Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369 (D.C.Cir. 1976), cert. denied
1159 (1977).
404 U.S. 528 (1972).
See Usery v. Local 639, Teamsters, 543 F.2d 369 (D.C.Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
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The Landrum-Griffin developments reflect differences from the
basic federal statutes in the field of labor relations, but the central
point is the same: an active agency-court partnership serves to improve agency determinations by refining the details of a statutory
scheme and by fashioning procedures to enhance rational decisionmaking.
U.S. 1123 (1977); Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers, 554 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. filed,
No. 77-643, November 2, 1977.
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